

Message Text

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INR-10 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 DRC-01

DPW-01 PRS-01 OMB-01 SS-20 /156 W

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P R 110605Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4573

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

USDEL JEC PARIS UNN

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

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AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

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AMCONSUL DANANG
AMCONSUL NHA TRANG
DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USDAO/SAIGON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 6162/1

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT PFOR ECON VS
SUBJ: EMBASSY SAIGON'S NORTH VIET-NAM BI-WEEKLY NO 8.

BANGKOK ALSO PASS OSA; DEPT ALSO FOR AID/W; CINCPAC FOR POLAD;
DOD FOR USAJFKCMA ATTN: ATCS-WL-DSA

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SUMMARY: INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND RECENT PERSONNEL CHANGES WITHIN THE DRV GOVERNMENT INDICATE THAT HANOI IS FOCUSING INCREASINGLY ON LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, NVA CHIEF OF STAFF VAN TIEN DUNG WAS ELEVATED TO SENIOR GENERAL AND A NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS APPARENTLY WERE ALSO PROMOTED.

A CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY PARTY COMMITTEE WAS HELD EARLY THIS YEAR PROBABLY TO DEVISE WAYS TO EASE FRICTIONS BETWEEN COMMAND AND POLITICAL CADRES AND TO RESOLVE OTHER PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE NVA'S DRIVE TOWARD MODERNIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION. THE MAY 5 PEOPLE'S COUNCILS ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN THE WAKE OF HIGH LEVEL CRITICISM OF PAST BALLOTING PROCEDURES AND OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCILS ONCE IN OFFICE. THE MAY DAY FESTIVITIES WERE A LOW-KEY AFFAIR THIS YEAR, WITH THE APPEARANCE OF VO NGUYEN GIAP THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE PROCEEDINGS. HANOI HAS, PREDICTABLY, BLASTED THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOR AID TO THE GVN. A DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY FUNCTIONARY MADE OFFICIAL HANOI'S DECISION NOT TO ATTEND THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFAB AND, IN THE PROCESS, GOT IN SOME GRATUITOUS DIGS AT CERTAIN ASEAN MEMBERS. HANOI'S SOUTHERN MOUTHPIECE, THE "PRG" VOICED ITS GRATITUDE TO AUSTRALIA'S MINISTER FOR FOREIGN TRADE FOR HIS PAST SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS' STRUGGLE AGAINST
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THE US AND THE "REACTIONARY" AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATION TOPPLED BY THE ALP IN 1972. FIVE MORE ENVOYS HAVE VISITED THE VC ZONE TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS TO THE "PRG". END SUMMARY.

PART I: POLICY AND PLANNING: TOWARD LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT

1. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE FOCUSING INCREASINGLY ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOP-

MENT AS WELL AS THE IMMEDIATE DEMANDS OF RECONSTRUCTION. ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE REPORTING, THE 22ND PLENUM OF THE LAO DONG PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR OPTED FOR A TWO-YEAR RECONSTRUCTION PLAN TO BE FOLLOWED IN 1976 BY A FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. HANOI'S LAST FIVE-YEAR PLAN WAS ABANDONED IN 1964 IN FAVOR OF ILL-DEFINED ONE-YEAR PLANS THAT ALLOWED FOR MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY AT THE HIGHT OF THE WAR.

2. EARLY THIS YEAR, THERE APPARENTLY WAS STILL CONSIDERABLE DEBATE AMONG HANOI'S LEADERS ABOUT HOW FAR AND HOW FAST TO PURSUE THE 22ND PLENUM'S RESOLUTION. IN HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS, SOME OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY ARGUED THAT SUBSTANTIVE STEPS TOWARDS LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT SHOULD AWAIT VICTORY IN THE SOUTH. OTHERS, PURPORTEDLY LED BY SUPPORTERS OF PHAM VAN DONG, INSISTED THAT IMMEDIATE CONCRETE STOPS WERE NECESSARY TO INSURE THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE. ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, A COMPROMISE WAS REACHED WHEREBY THE PACE OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PLANNING WOULD BEKEYED TO THE LEVEL OF AID FROM HANOI'S ALLIES.

3. SINCE THEN, SEVERAL SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES HAVE SENT NEGOTIATORS TO HANOI TO WORK OUT AID AGREEMENTS TOSUPPLEMENT ONES DRAFTED LAST FALL. SOME OF THESE TRANSACTIONS APPARENTLY ARE GEARED TO REQUIREMENTS REACHING BEYOND THOSE OF THE NEXT TWO YEARS. FOR INSTANCE, A RECENT BULGARIAN PROTOCOL ESTABLISHED AID GUIDELINES THROUGH 1980.

4. AMONT OTHER INDICATORS OF HANOI'S POLICY DIRECTION ARE RECENT GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES. WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF POLITIBURO MEMBER, LE THANH NGHI, TO HEAD THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION, THE REGIME IN EFFECT HAS UPGRADED THE MECHANISM RESPONSIBLE FOR PUTTING TOGETHER LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PLANS. THE LAST TIME A POLITIBURO FIGURE CHAIRED THE COMMISSION WAS IN THE 1958-1965 PERIOD WHEN HANOI'S FIRST AND ONLY FIVE-YEAR PLAN WAS DRAFTED
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AND PUT INTO EFFECT. THE RECENT DESIGNATION OF THREE NEW VICE PREMIERS TO HEAD NEWLY FOREMD "BLOCS" OF MINISTRIES CONCERNED WITH ECONOMIC TASKS ALSO APPEARS TO SERVE THE PURPOSES OF LONG-RANGE DEVELOPMENT. IN EFFECT, IT CREATES A SUPERCABINET WITH CNTROL OVER EVERY ASPECT OF THE ECONOMY. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE APPOINTMENTS HAVE ENHANCED PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG'S CAPACITY TO PUSH HIS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PREFERENCES.

5. OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS, DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN WHICH ALSO POINT TOWARDS LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLANS. THE FIRST GENERAL CENSUS SINCE 1960 HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED. THIS IS A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE REGIME'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A SOUND PLANNING BASE WHICH BEGAN WITH AN INVENTORY OF STATE PROPERTY LAST FALL. THE 1960 CENSUS WAS A COROLLARY OF HANOI'S FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN. THE REGIME ALSO IS PUSSHING A

POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION PROGRAM FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE
EARLY 1960'S.

6. THESE TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC PLANNING
ARE NOT IRREVERSIBLE. THE REGIME OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT PURSUED THEM
FAR, AND THE PROCESS COULD BE CANCELLED OUT IF THE LEADERSHIP SAW
A PROMISING OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE A MILITARY SOLUTION IN THE SOUTH.
HOWEVER, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT EACH SMALL ADVANCE TENDS TO
STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE IN THE LEADERSHIP WHO ADVOCATE
A MORE BALANCED APPROACH TO UNIFICATION AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT
THAN HAS BEEN FOLLOWED IN RECENT YEARS.
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USLO PEKING
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PART II: POLITICO/MILITARY AFFAIRS

A. MORE CHANGES IN DRV CABINET

1. ON APRIL 26,1974, THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPROVED SEVERAL ADDITIONAL CHANGES IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: (A) VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT MEMBER HOANG ANH WAS RELIEVED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION (CAG), A POSITION HE HAD HELD SINCE THE CAG'S FORMATION IN 1971 (HOANG ANH APPARENTLY RETAINS HIS VICE-PREMIERSHIP). ANH WAS NOT MENTIONED FOR ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT, NOR WAS HIS SUCCESSOR NAMED. (B) NGUYEN HUU KHIEU, ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WAS RELIEVED AS MINISTER OF LABOR, A POSITION HE HAS HELD SINCE 1965, IN ORDER TO "ASSUME ANOTHER FUNCTION". THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION OF HIS ONGOING ASSIGNMENT. KHIEU'S REPLACEMENT IS NGUYEN THO CHAN, ALSO A VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE ALTERNATE, WHOSE MOST RECENT ASSIGNMENT WAS AMB TO MOSCOW (1967-1971) AND SWEDEN (1969-1971). FROM 1963 TO 1966, CHAN HEADED THE LABOR MINISTRY'S MANPOWER DEPT AND IT IS PROBABLY THAT EXPERIENCE UPON WHICH HIS CURRENT ASSIGNMENT WAS BASED. (C) VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE ALTERNATE NGUYEN HUU MAI WAS RELIEVED AS MINISTER OF POWER AND COAL IN ORDER TO "ASSUME ANOTHER FUNCTION." MAI BECAME MINISTER OF HEAVY INDUSTRY IN 1967. WHEN THAT MINISTRY WAS SPLIT IN 1969, HE TOOK OVER THE

NEWLY-CREATED POWER AND COAL JOB. NEITHER MAI'S REPLACEMENT NOR HIS FUTURE ASSIGNMENT ARE KNOWN. MAI ALSO HAS BEEN CHAIRMAN OF THE VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INDUSTRIAL BOARD SINCE 1964, A POSITION HE MAY STILL HOLD.

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2. THESE MOST RECENT CHANGES IN THE DRV GOVT STRUCTURE APPARENTLY ARE PART OF A BROAD REORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ARE RELATED TO VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM RESOLUTION 22'S DEMANDS FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY IN ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT. THE CHANGES HAVE AFFECTED 12 MINISTERIAL RANK POSITIONS OF WHICH SIX REMAIN VACANT. END LIMITED OFFICIAL USE. BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL.

B. NVA PROMOTIONS REVEALED

1. THE ELEVATION OF NVA CHIEF OF STAFF VAN TIEN DUNG TO THE ARMU'S HIGHEST RANK, SENIOR GENERAL, WAS ONE OF APPARENTLY NUMEROUS PROMOTIONS REVEALED AT THE RECENT CONFERENCE OF NVA POLITICAL CADRES. COVERAGE OF THE CONFERENCE INDICATED THAT SONG HAO, THE POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE NVA, HAD BEEN PROMOTED TO COLONEL GENERAL AND THAT OTHER UNNAMED OFFICIERS HAD BEEN AWARDED FLAG RANK.

2. DUNG, WHO HAS BEEN FILLING IN FOR THE AILING VO NGUYEN GIAP (THE NVA'S ONLY OTHER SENIOR GENERAL), IS ALMOST CERTAINLY BEING GROOMED TO REPLACE THE LATTER AS DEFENSE MINISTER. A STRONG ADVOCATE OF MODERNIZING HANOI'S ARMED FORCES, DUNG EMPHASIZES THE USE OF COMBINED ARMS TACTICS AND IS BELIEVED TO SUPPORT THE STRATEGY OF MAIN-FORCE WARFARE. AT 57, THE YOUNGEST MEMBER OF THE VWP POLITIBURO, DUNG IS ALSO LISTED LAST IN THAT BODY'S PECKING ORDER.

3. SONG HAO'S PROMOTION SUGGESTS THAT HE WILL BECOME CHIEF OF STAFF WHEN DUNG MOVES UPSTAIRS. SONG HAO, IN TURN, MAY BE REPLACED BY MAJOR GENERAL LE QUANG DAO WHO HAS, AS HAO'S DEPUTY, BEEN WRITING VOLUMINOUSLY IN RECENT MONTHS ON THE TOPIC OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE.

C. CENTRAL MILITARY PARTY COMMITTEE ISSUES RESOLUTION

1. IN ITS CONTINUING COVERAGE OF THE "DETERMINED-TO-WIN" EMULATION CAMPAIGN FIRST ANNOUNCED ON APRIL 14, RADIO HANOI HAS FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO A "RECENT" CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY PARTY COMMITTEE (CMPC), THE VWP'S SHADOWY MILITARY AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION. AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE CONFERENCE SUGGESTS THAT AT LEAST SOME MILITARY LEADERS ARE NOT ENTIRELY

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SATISFIED WITH THE VPA'S PROJECTED POST-WAR ROLE, AND THAT THERE IS FRICTION BETWEEN COMMAND CADRE AND THEIR POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS WITHIN THE ARMY.

2. THE CMPC CONFERENCE (CITED BY ONE REPORT AS THE SECOND SUCH GATHERING) WAS FIRST ALLUDED TO IN A LENGTHY ARTICLE IN THE MARCH 1974 ISSUE OF "TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN" BY MAJOR GENERAL LE QUANG DAO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE VPA'S GENERAL POLITICAL DIRECTORATE AND A MEMBER OF THE CMPC. ALTHOUGH DAO DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE CONFERENCE, HE DID CITE A CMPC RESOLUTION WHICH, IN CONTEXT, APPEARED FAIRLY RECENT. BASED ON THE CONTENT OF DAO'S ARTICLE, THE CMPC CONFERENCE APPEARS TO HAVE DEALT IN DEPTH WITH THE PLANNED DEVELOPMENT OF THE VPA AND, PARTICULARLY, WITH PROBLEMS OF PARTY ROLES IN A NEW "STANDARDIZED AND MODERNIZED ARMY."

3. DAO ALSO ADDRESSED PROBLEMS OF CONTRADICTORY PARTY AND MILITARY COMMAND CHANNELS WITHIN THE VPA; FAULTY MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS; RESISTANCE TO INCREASED EMPHASIS ON POLITICS; THE TENDENCY OF SOME MILITARY LEADERS TO SHY AWAY FROM MAIN-FORCE ACTIONS AND OPERATIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION WITH MILITIA AND GUERRILLA FORCES; AND LACK OF DISCIPLINE. DAO SPECIFICALLY NOTED THE NEED TO UPGRADE CADRES TECHNICAL AND LEADERSHIP ABILITIES.

4. APPARENTLY TO IMPLEMENT THE CMPC CONFERENCE RESOLUTION, THE CMPC'S STANDING COMMITTEE DIRECTED THE INITIATION OF AN ARMED FORCES-WIDE "DETERMINED-TO-WIN" EMULATION CAMPAIGN. THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN IS TO INDOCTRINATE MILITARYMEN REGARDING THEIR ROLE IN THE "NEW PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION". THE DIRECTIVE SET FORTH THREE OBJECTIVES: THE CREATION OF "A NEW REVOLUTIONARY IMPETUS" WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES; THE SWIFT DEVELOPMENT OF A MODERN MILITARY APPARATUS; AND THE MOTIVATION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO "POSITIVELY PARTICIPATE" IN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. COMMENTING EDITORIALY ON THE DIRECTIVE, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN NOTED THAT SUCH EMULATION CAMPAIGNS HAVE BEEN INITIATED "EACH TIME THAT OUR REVOLUTION HAS UNDERGONE CHANGES." END CONFIDENTIAL.

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D. PEOPLE'S COUNCIL ELECTIONS HELD

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1. ELECTIONS FOR PEOPLE'S COUNCIL SEATS IN THE DRV'S TWO AUTONOMOUS REGIONS, 23 PROVINCES AND TWO MUNICIPALITIES DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE CENTRAL GOVT WERE HELD MAY 5 AMIDST

HIGH-LEVEL CRITICISM OF VOTING PROCEDURES AND THE FUNCTIONING OF
COUNCILS ONCE ELECTED.

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2. IN ONE PRESS ARTICLE, HOANG QUOC VIET, MEMBER OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE VIETNAM FATHERLAND FRONT AND HEAD OF THE NORTH'S TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION, ADMITTED THAT IN THE PAST "THE PEOPLE'S RIRJOCQTO VOTESBHTYRUN FOR ELECTION HAS NOT REALLY BEEN RESPECTED." VIET ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PEOPLE'S COUNCILS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES THEY ELSMZ HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY (IN MOST CASES, LEADING MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE PARTY COMMITTEE, WHICH TENDS TO TREAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE AS A SUBORDINATE ORGAN.)

3. INFORMATION AVAILABLE CONCERNING PEOPLE'S COUNCIL CANDIDATES IN HANOI PROBABLY REFLECTS THE GENERAL SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE DRV. HANOI'S VARIOUS AGENCIES AND ORGANS PUT FORWARD 252 PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATES FOR THE CITY'S 140 SEATS. OF THESE, THE MUNICIPAL FATHERLAND FRONT COMMITTEE APPROVED 211. (THE FRONT APPARENTLY DISALLOWED THE CANDIDACIES OF THE OTHER 41.) TWO OTHER CANDIDATE, BOTH VWP CADRES, WERE ALLOWED TO RUN WITHOUT FRONT SPONSORHSIP. A THIRD OF THE CANDIDATES WERE MEMBERS OF THE OUTGOING PEOPVN'S COUNCIL (ELECTED IN APRIL 1971). 62;34 40 PERCENT OF THE CANDIDATES WERE WOMEN AND ALMOST 80 PERCENT WERE REPORTED TO BE INDUSTRIAL OR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS (AN EXAMINATION OF THE LIST OF CANDIDATES INDICATES THAT MANY OF THESE "WORKERS" HOLD MANAGERIAL AND CADRE POSITIONS). NORTH VIETNAMESE SOURCES CLAIMED A VOTER TURNOUT OF 99.16 PERCENT. END UNCLASSIFIED.

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E. HANOI CELEBRATES MAY DAY IN LOW-KEY FASHION

IN CONTRAST TO LAST YEAR'S GALA, WHICH INCLUDED AN UNPRECEDENTED MILITARY PARADE, HANOI THIS YEAR RESTRICTED ITS CELEBRATION OF MAY
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DAY TO A RALLY IN THE BA DINH CONFERENCE HALL THE EVENING OF APRIL 30. THE HIGH POINT OF THE RALLY WAS THE APPEARANCE OF VO NGUYEN GIAP WHO HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM PUBLIC VIEW FOR NEARLY SEVEN MONTHS. PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG MADE A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT AFTER WHICH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER HOAN QUOC VIET DELIVERED THE MAJOR ADDRESS. WHILE VIET'S TALK WAS UNEXCEPTIONAL, HANOI'S COVERAGE OF IT WAS NOT. VNA'S EXCERPTS OF THE SPEECH CONTAIN REFERENCE TO "A DOUBLE-DEALING POLICY" OF THE US AIMED AT DIVIDING THE SOCIALIST AND NATIONALIST COUNTRIES (SEE FBIS OKINAWA 301739 APRIL 74). THIS PASSAGE WAS NOT OBSERVED IN DOMESTIC COVERAGE OF THE SPEECH (FBIS SAIGON 010735 AND 010255 MAY 74 AND FBIS BANGKOK 301610 APRIL 74). END LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.

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PART III: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A. COMMUNISTS RAP ADMINISTRATION AID PROPOSALS

HANOI AND THE VIET CONG CONDEMNED THE PROPOSALS NOW BEFORE CONGRESS WHICH WOULD INCREASE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE GVN. "NHAN DAN" CLAIMED ON APRIL 26 THAT THE MONIES WOULD BE USED TO FINANCE A "DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR" IN FURTHERANCE OF THE US'S "AGGRESSIVE POLICY." IN AN APRIL 30 COMMENTARY, THE ARMY NEWSPAPER, "QUAN DOI NHAN DAN", FOCUSED ITS ATTACK ON US OFFICIALS, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR MARTIN WHO, IT SAID, HAD PERPETRATED A "BRAZEN, DECEITFUL TRICK" BY SUGGESTING THAT INCREASED AID TO THE GVN NOW MIGHT ALLOW AID TO BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED OR EVEN TERMINATED IN A FEW YEARS. HANOI HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID A FLAT PREDICTION OF DEFEAT FOR THE PROPOSALS BUT A HANOI RADIO COMMENTARY ON APRIL 30 CAME CLOSE WHEN IT AVERRED THAT "US POLITICAL CIRCLES AND PUBLIC WILL NOT ALLOW THE NIXON-KISSINGER CLIQUE TO PLUNGE THE UNITED STATES INTO NEW DISASTERS."

B. HANOI NIXES ASEAN MEET

VNA REPORTED ON MAY 4 THAT A RESPONSIBLE DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL HAD TOLD THE INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR IN HANOI THAT THE DRV WOULD NOT SEND AN OBSERVER TO THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONFERENCE WHICH OPENED IN JAKARTA ON MAY 7. THE OFFICIAL SAID HANOI DOUBTED THE SINCERITY OF "SOME" ASEAN COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT
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TO THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD "PEACE, INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL RIGHTS" BECAUSE THEY HAD SENT "MERCENARIES" TO FIGHT FOR THE US IN INDOCHINA AND ALLOWED US MILITARY BASES ON THEIR TERRITORIES. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, "MANY" ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE "NOT YET ADOPTED A CORRECT ATTITUDE" TOWARD THE "PRG". (COMMENT: HANOI'S REJECTION OF THE INVITATION WAS ANTICIPATED IN SAIGON 4082, NORTH VIET-NAM

BI-WEEKLY NO. 5. END COMMENT.)

C. VIET CONG THANKS CAIRNS FOR SUPPORT

APPARENTLY OBLIVIOUS TO THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS, THE VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVE IN HANOI HAS SENT A LETTER TO DR. JAMES CAIRNS, MINISTER FOR OVERSEAS TRADE, "TO ACCLAIM HIS GOOD DEEDS WHICH ARE BEING POSITIVELY RESPONDED TO BY AUSTRALIAN PROGRESSIVE FORCES." A LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) COMMENTARY BROADCAST BY LIBERATION RADIO ON APRIL 27 STATED THAT BEFORE THE LABOR GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER, "UNDER THE JOINT LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE LEFT WING OF THE LABOR PARTY, THE PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN AUSTRALIA--A TYPICAL LEADER OF WHICH IS DR. JAMES CAIRNS--HAD BROADLY GROUPED THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS TO STIR UP A NATIONWIDE MOVEMENT TO OPPOSE THE UNITED STATES AND THE REACTIONARY AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATION..." THE COMMENTARY AVERTED THAT THE "STRUGGLE MOVEMENT" HEADED BY CAIRNS WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE FALL OF THE COUNTRY-LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. END UNCLASSIFIED.

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D. MORE DIPLOMATS PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN VC ZONE.

FIVE ARAB AND AFRICAN DIPLOMATS RECENTLY PRESENTED THEIR CREDENTIALS TO "PRG" CHIEFTAIN NGUYEN HUU THO IN DRV-CONTROLLED NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED WERE BURUNDI, IRAQ, SYRIA, UGANDA AND YEMEN (PDRY). THE NEW AMBASSADORS ARE ALL RESIDENT IN EITHER HANOI OR PEKING. (COMMENT: THIS BRINGS THE TOTAL OF ACCREDITATIONS IN DRV-HELD TERRITORY TO 24, NOT INCLUDING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS "LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS. THE MAJORITY OF THE ENVOYS ARE RESIDENT IN NEARBY ASIAN CAPITALS, BUT SOME ARE AS FAR AWAY AS RANGOON AND NEW DELHI. WHILE A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA AMONG THEM, HAVE ASSIGNED ENVOYS SPECIFICALLY TO THE "PRG", NONE OF THESE PERSONNEL

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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974SAIGON06162
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740115-1065
From: SAIGON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740555/aaaabwpe.tel
Line Count: 578
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 22 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22 APR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <13 FEB 2003 by GarlanWA>
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EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: EMBASSY SAIGON'S NORTH VIET-NAM BI-WEEKLY NO 8. BANGKOK ALSO PASS OSA; DEPT ALSO FOR AID/W; CINCPAC FOR POLAD;
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, ECON, VS
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005